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ABSTRACT  
 
Literature is rich on whether and how rights are limited by external considerations, such as other rights 
or particularly important general interests. This article concentrates on what could be a different type of 
limit of rights: internal limits stemming from the very foundations of a right. Its aim is to understand 
whether these hypothetically different internal limits actually collapse on the idea of internal limits of 
coherence theories; or whether they are equivalent, in terms of effects, to external limits to rights.  
In order to show the origin of the troubling with internal limits, the article begins with a brief 
introduction of biocultural rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and of the challenges 
they encountered, allegedly, because of the internal limits that rose from their foundations. It then 
concentrates on coherence theories and the internal limits they envisage, and continues with the analysis 
of two examples – freedom of expression and parental rights – in order to understand whether turning 
external limits into internal ones causes any change in the arising normative positions. Building on this 
thought experiment, it tries to explain which of the sui generis features of biocultural rights are, actually, 
due to their double foundation and which, instead, are generated by other, concealed operations. Finally, 
after recognizing the complexities of the idea of care and stewardship between two subjects/interests, it 
points out the more subtle implications of internal limits of rights, opening the way to considerations 
concerning the way legal concepts are used and interpreted.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Literature is rich on the limits of rights1, may they be limits arising from conflicts with other 
rights or from conflicts with particularly important and pressing interests of the collectivity 
(such as public safety or democracy2). This debate is most often concentrated on positions that 
deny and positions that accept the existence of such conflicts (coherence theories vs pluralist 
theories3), or on asserting which of these limits are justified, and which are threats to and 
violations of rights4. 
This article concentrates, instead, on what could be a different type of limit, an internal one 
stemming from the conflicts that may arise between the very foundations of a right5. 
 
 
*  A previous version of this paper was presented at the XXIV Congreso ítalo-franco-luso-español de teoría del derecho, 
19-20 October 2018, Girona. I am much indebted to Jordi Ferrer for inviting me to the Congress; to Bruno Celano 
for showing me new routes, and warning me against unseen problems; to Natalia Scavuzzo for her precious 
comments; to the two anonymous referees for their attentive reading; to Giorgio Maniaci for his sharp look at my 
words; to Marco Brigaglia for the support received in conceiving the article, developing its content, refining its 
shape, and (most importantly) for helping me find the time to write it; last but not least, to my son Stefano, for 
sharing his mother with the computer and for taking his first flight to reach Girona. 
**  This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under the Marie Skłodowska Curie grant agreement no. 851546. 
1  The analysis of the limits of rights is very much dependent on the definition chosen to describe them (on the 
incompatibility or lack thereof among fundamental rights, see COMANDUCCI 2004, 317 ff.). For example, as 
WALDRON noted (1993, 205), the very thin and negative construction of rights as side-constraints proposed by 
NOZICK (1974) saves rights from the possibility of finding limits in each other, as each individual shall simply be 
concerned with her/his omissions and no actions is entailed. In this paper, I adopt an interest theory of rights, 
which appears to me as the most suitable to handle the current understanding of rights (CELANO 2001). I will 
consider X to have a right when «other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty» (RAZ 1988, 166). And I will consider that «a right of 
one person […] is the ground of a duty, ground which, if not counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies 
holding that other person to have the duty» (RAZ 1988, 171). I will also adopt a dynamic vision of rights according 
to which each right grounds different duties, which are not all predefined and static as they may change depending 
on the circumstances (RAZ 1988, 171). 
2  In the words of Wenar: «Each right trumps competing considerations in most circumstances, but there are 
certain circumstances in which another right with higher priority – or a pressing non-right consideration – 
determines what may or should be done» (WENAR 2011, 26). 
3  CELANO 2013, 138 ff. For a reconstruction of the debate on conflictivism and non-conflictivism in human rights, 
see MALDONADO MUÑOZ 2016. 
4  See for example Thomson’s distinction between violation and infringement of rights (THOMSON 1977); and 
GEWIRTH’s (1981, 92) distinction between the violation of a right – unjustified infringement – and the override of a 
right – a justified infringement. See also CELANO 2013, 140, on the (mere) rhetoric value of this distinction.  
5  With foundation of a right it is meant the very reasons/interests/needs a right grounds upon/was recognized for 
(whether from a moral, legal, or political point of view). FERRAJOLI (2001, 298 ff.) distinguishes four meanings of 
 
204 | Giulia Sajeva 
This enquiry emerged vis à vis the unexpected limits emerging out of a construct, biocultural 
rights of indigenous peoples and local communities6, which, while promising harmony and 
achievements, encountered some cumbersome limits. Their allegedly internal limits nurtured 
pressing political and rhetorical implications to the point of fuelling the attacks of a very 
politicized debate (as the one on indigenous peoples rights is). 
The nature of these unexpected internal limits remains quite opaque and in need for 
clarifications7. Are these internal limits something sui generis, which has its specific consequences 
and rules? Or are they nothing more than irrelevant and fungible architecture of rights? Are their 
consequences equivalent to those of classic external limits? Or to those of the internal limits 
coherence theories describe? 
In order to show the origin of the troubling with internal limits, the article begins with a 
brief introduction of biocultural rights and of the challenges they encountered, allegedly, 
because of the internal limits that rose from their foundations. It then concentrates on 
coherence theories and the internal limits they envisage, and continues with the analysis of two 
examples – freedom of expression and parental rights – in order to understand whether turning 
external limits into internal ones causes any change in the normative positions that arise. 
Building on this thought experiment, it tries to explain which of the sui generis features of 
biocultural rights are, actually, due to their double foundation and which, instead, are generated 
by other, concealed operations. Finally, the article points out the more subtle implications of 
internal limits, opening the way to considerations concerning the way legal concepts are used 
and interpreted.  
 
 
2. The strange case of biocultural rights 
 
Biocultural rights are an idea developed in 2010 predominantly by Sanjay Kabir Bavikatte8, an 
Indian scholar and activist highly engaged in issues concerning the rights of indigenous peoples 
and local communities and their virtuous relationship with the environment. The protection of 
the environment is widely debated because of its importance for the future of the world and 
humanity – as well described by the idea of Anthropocene9 – but also, increasingly, for the 
danger it posed and still poses on indigenous peoples and local communities living in 
biodiversity-rich areas. In fact, the interests of indigenous peoples and local communities to live 
and dwell on their traditional lands have often been jeopardized by old style fences-and-fines 
conservation approaches10 built on the assumption that humans are bound to hurt the 
environment and their presence must be avoided if protection is to be assured. Bavikatte’s work 
 
 
the term foundation: the reason, or theorical foundation; the source, or legal foundation; the justification, or 
assiological foundation; the origin, or historical-social foundation. In this paper, we will refer to the third meaning, 
i.e. the normative answer to the question: which rights should be given recognition?  
6  BAVIKATTE 2014; SAJEVA 2018. 
7  During my writing of my book on biocultural rights, I realized how important these unexpected internal limits 
were and I stumbled with their pressing political and rhetorical implications. However, to tell the truth, at the 
beginning this distinction appeared to me quite clear and not deserving particular attention. I was wrong. While I 
expected complicated critiques concerning anthropocentric and non anthropocentric views, perplexity against the 
importance I gave to environmental considerations, and complete denials of the alleged existence of this strange 
thing called biocultural rights, I most often encountered critiques and requests for clarifications concerning the 
distinction, or lack thereof, between what I called internal limits of biocultural rights, and more classical external 
and internal limits. 
8  BAVIKATTE, ROBINSON 2011; BAVIKATTE 2014. For a critical analysis of biocultural rights, underlining their 
specific characteristics, as well as their positive and negative sides, see SAJEVA 2018. 
9  CRUTZEN, STOERMER 2000; ZALASIEWICZ et al. 2017. 
10  MACKENZIE 1988; UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2016; MBARIA, OGADA 2017. 
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on biocultural rights, gaining strength from a wide and growing literature, challenged these 
assumptions which so often lead to the eviction of indigenous peoples and local communities 
for the creation of protected areas. He retold how it is widely demonstrated that some 
indigenous peoples and local communities have preserved traditional ways of life that are 
actually supportive of the environment. 
Biocultural rights are defined as those rights that indigenous peoples and local communities 
need in order to maintain their role as stewards of the environment of their lands and waters. 
Biocultural rights build on the understanding that those communities and peoples, whose ways 
of life are erected on the idea of care for the environment, need to be recognized a cluster of 
rights in order to maintain those practices and ways of life that make them environmental 
stewards11. More precisely, a basket of rights which includes: right to self-government, right to 
cultural diversity, right to lands and resources, and the complementary procedural rights. 
Building on these assumptions and looking at the developments of international environmental 
law and policy and at court cases12, Bavikatte came to the conclusion that biocultural rights are 
currently emerging as a new human right13, and at the same time expressed an opinio de iure 
condendo in favour of their recognition for moral and political reasons14. 
At a first glance, biocultural rights appear as grounded on the single interest of indigenous 
peoples and local communities to act as environmental stewards. A closer look, however, shows 
how this foundation is actually the product of the combination of two different interests, 
belonging to the two different subjects that biocultural rights aim at protecting. A first 
foundation being the interest of indigenous peoples and local communities to live according to 
their self-determined practices and worldviews in their traditional lands. A second foundation 
being a more complex and sui generis one, the conservation of the environment, which may be 
declined as an interest of nature itself15 (where nature is recognised as one of the right-
 
 
11  Among the others, see: PRETTY et al. 2009; MEINE 2010; AGRAWAL, GIBSON 1999; GAVIN et al. 2015; REED 2008; 
OUDENHOVEN et al. 2010; SCHMIDT, PETERSON 2009; MAFFI, WOODLEY 2010; POSEY 1999. 
12  International environmental law has shown the ability and willingness to increasingly acknowledge the need to 
recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities in conjunction with environmental 
protection. See: the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement, the 2001 Food and Agriculture 
Organization International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the 1995 Agreement for 
the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification, 
the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. See also: 2009 Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya case of the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights; 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter 
American Court of Human Rights, No.79, Ser. C; 2013 Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. Versus Ministry of 
Environment & Forests & Others. 
13  I here use the term human rights as tools to further particularly important interests of individuals and groups, 
where at least one of such interests is considered as having an ultimate value, and as being so important (from a 
moral, legal or political point on view) to «set the limits to the sovereignty of States» (RAZ 2010, 328; BEITZ 2003). 
Today, human rights are most often described as rights «that we have simply in virtue of being human» (GRIFFIN 
2008, 2), and not because of race, citizenship, gender, class, and so on. However, as the idea of human rights and 
their international and national recognition have evolved (BOBBIO 1990), human rights have come to include the 
rights of groups, such indigenous peoples, which are considered holders of value as groups, per se, and which are in 
need of special protection. 
14  There currently exists no explicit legal recognition of biocultural rights, but only a number of texts that have been 
interpreted as recognizing them. Biocultural rights may or may not move to the next stage of a fully recognized human 
right in international law, however, they deserve attention to understand their potential implications for indigenous 
peoples and local communities. 
15  In fact, if the protection of the environment was not treated as such, biocultural rights would appear as a cluster 
of indigenous peoples rights concerning access and use of lands and natural resources. They would be indigenous 
rights, solely grounded on the ultimate interests and value of indigenous peoples. 
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holders)16. Reading carefully Bavikatte’s words17 and the texts he cites18, biocultural rights stem 
from environmentally relevant documents whose ultimate goal is the protection of biodiversity 
because it has an intrinsic value19, and indigenous peoples figure as subjects whose rights are to 
be protected because they have preserved ways of life relevant for biodiversity20, not simply 
because they are holders of intrinsic value as indigenous. 
The double foundation21 of biocultural rights, which protects the interests of two distinct 
subjects, leads to some troubling implications, which differentiate them from indigenous 
peoples rights22. Unless we fall for the idea of the noble savage myth – according to which 
indigenous peoples and local communities are always and will always remain pacific friends of 
the Earth23 – we face potential conflicts that may arise between the two very foundations of 
biocultural rights, i.e. between the two subjects whose interests should be protected by 
biocultural rights. The right to self-government, as well as cultural and land rights, exercised by 
indigenous peoples and local communities as holders of biocultural rights might, in fact, at 
times, clash with the preservation a certain ecosystem, species or non-living natural entities. 
There is no necessary, perpetual, coincidence between the interests of the so-called stewards of 
the environment and the environment. They might be in the position to/want to act as stewards 
at times, but not at other times. Changes occurring outside a community24, or changes occurring 
within a community25, may lead to consequences which run counter the interest for the 
conservation of the environment. 
Given that both foundations and interests-holders (indigenous peoples and nature) have 
equal standing within biocultural rights, both are equally sought to be protected and achieved 
through the instrument of biocultural rights. But when they cannot walk hand in hand, they act 
as limits one to the other. Such limits, however, appear as stronger than classic external limits: 
 
 
16 Whether it is appropriate to treat nature as a holder of rights is a complex issue which is not relevant for the 
purpose of this paper. For a treatment of its main contours see STONE 1972; SURRALLÉS 2017; STUDLEY, BLEISCH 
2018; KAUFFMAN, MARTIN 2017. For a collection of court cases recognizing nature (or parts thereof) as rightholders, 
see: www.naturerightswatch.com. 
17  «The demand for biocultural rights» he underlines, «does not take as its point of departure the inherent right of 
a group or community to flourish, but rather […] the ethic of stewardship: it is the ethic of stewardship and not the 
group per se that justifies the right» (BAVIKATTE 2014, 142 f.).  
18  See above, note 12. 
19  Preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity: «Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity 
and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of 
biological diversity and its components. […] Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common 
concern of humankind». 
20  Quite explicatory is article 8j of the Convention on Biological Diversity, considered to be one of the central 
tools of the debate on indigenous peoples and the environment: «Each contracting Party shall, as far as possible and 
as appropriate: Subject to national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices 
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity». 
21  Throughout the whole article I will refer to double-foundation rights. However, there is no reason to exclude 
the fact that foundations may also be more than two.  
22 To be noted that biocultural rights are also different from indigenous peoples rights because they are pictured as 
held, equally, by local communities, i.e. those communities that do not fit with indigenous peoples definitions and 
henceforth do not have the same rights. I have dwelt extensively on this difference in SAJEVA 2018 (chap. 5), while 
in this paper I will focus solely on indigenous peoples because their reference as holders of biocultural rights is 
precisely what sparked the fierce criticists mentioned above. 
23  See the movie Avatar (2010) for very simple and Hollywoodian representation of the noble savage myth. For a 
more scholarly and deep reconstruction see ELLINGSON 2001. 
24  Such as for example, the abundance of a certain hunted species decreases; or access to a once well conserved area 
becomes a threat for the area itself. 
25  Such as for example, the decision to aim for unsustainable, though legal, projects, such as the concession of an 
area for timber production; or changes in religious practices that lead to the increase of the population. 
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they seem to concretise in the form of duties towards the environment: indigenous peoples and 
local communities whose biocultural rights are recognized are called not only not to harm the 
environment, they are called to promote the conservation of the environment26. A duty which 
stems from the fact that, within the biocultural rights construct, indigenous peoples and local 
communities are not the only holders of protected interests; also the environment is. Such duty 
arises with the acceptance of biocultural rights: i.e. once a community claims for the recognition 
and protection of its biocultural rights, it implicitly (consciously or not) accepts to the duties 
they come along with27. 
The double foundation of biocultural rights led them to enter a very political debate. A 
debate in which their double foundation structure was very relevant for NGOs, activists, policy 
makers, indigenous representatives, and scientists. Biocultural rights were not only accused to 
be inconvenient for indigenous peoples (dismissing the fact that in certain situations they might 
be useful), but actually detrimental. From a political point of view, to claim that biocultural 
rights are limited by environmental considerations because they are part of their foundations, 
was received as being very much different from claiming that indigenous peoples rights are 
limited because there are particularly important and pressing interests of the collectivity (i.e. 
external limits) that need to be taken in consideration – even though such external interests 
may include particularly pressing environment concerns.  
Biocultural rights were perceived as different from many points of view28, which may be 
summarized as follows:  
 
1) The basket of rights to self-government and to land and to cultural diversity granted through 
biocultural rights appear as not only limited by other rights or very important considerations 
concerning the general interest. They appear to be limited, also, by the interest for the 
protection of the environment, whether it is particularly important or not (whether, for 
example, it concerns radioactive waste disposal or not)29. 
2) Indigenous peoples and local communities who claim biocultural rights are called to be and 
remain sustainable and are called to a duty of sustainability. Biocultural rights involve an 
active duty of care towards the environment on the part of their holders. Indigenous peoples 
rights, instead, do not require the exercise of the right to self-determination in ways that 
promote the conservation of the environment. It is sufficient for them not to harm the 
environment beyond certain limits (as those that apply to private property owners on 
radioactive waste disposal).  
 
 
26  On the difference between rights and so-called duty-rights, see MANIACI 2018.  
27  The community remains free to renounce to the duties biocultural rights come along with, but at the cost of 
renouncing, also, to the rights their basket contains. They are a take all or nothing deal, but not a compulsory one.  
28  For these reasons, it is true that biocultural rights are a second-best option to be, always, treated with care and 
attention. However, they might be a powerful tool in the hands of indigenous peoples whose indigenous status 
(and hence rights) is denied by the State they reside in, or whose rights are limited by environmental interests of 
the State (because they, for example, live in a protected area the State is not willing to degazette). 
Moreover, biocultural rights are particularly important because they propose the recognition of a set of human 
rights to local communities – which currently lack a full recognition as subjects of international law, and are only 
timidly seeing group human rights recognized to them (SAJEVA 2018). 
29  And, vice versa, the protection of the environment pursued through the instrument of biocultural rights finds a 
limit in the respect of the importance of the preservation of the cultural diversity of indigenous peoples and local 
communities and in the protection of their self-government. Hence, if for example the protection of a certain area 
may well be achieved through the construction of an old style people-out protected area, the recognition of 
biocultural rights to the inhabitants of that area requires to find a balance with their interests in pursuing their 
community life in that area, even if it may guarantee slower or lower (though still effective) conservation 
outcomes. For a deeper analysis of these points, see SAJEVA 2018. 
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3) Only indigenous peoples who live sustainably may be recognized as holders of biocultural 
rights, while to be holder of indigenous peoples rights it is sufficient to be indigenous. 
 
These characteristics appeared sui generis as compared to the classic understanding of rights and the 
expectations of the first biocultural rights’ interpreters. They were the unanticipated product of the 
double foundation, and consequent internal limits, of biocultural rights. In response to them, 
biocultural rights were accused of compromising the fight for indigenous peoples rights, providing 
States a more convenient alternative, less costly and with environmental outcomes. An alternative 
that could shift the burden of environmental protection, once again, on indigenous peoples, denying 
them single-foundation un(internally)limited indigenous peoples rights. Or, worst, that the rhetoric 
of environmental stewardship on behalf of indigenous peoples could endanger indigenous rights 
leading judges, politicians and the like, to consider sustainability a requirement to hold indigenous 
peoples rights as well. The violence of these critiques – partly justified, partly not – shaded the 
positive sides of the potential introduction of biocultural rights in international law. 
On the ground of these considerations, it may be said that the internal limits deriving from the 
two foundations of biocultural rights appear quite full of political implications. For this reason, 
this article uses biocultural rights to better understand the distinction, of lack thereof, between 
internal and external limits to rights. To begin our enquire, it will try to understand whether 
internal limits are, actually, nothing more that the limits that coherence theories try to cast away. 
 
 
3. Catch me if you can, coherence 
 
It is beautiful and fascinating to think that any ruler really wishing to protect rights will be able 
to do so, always and fully, without limitations. Unfortunately, it is necessary to accept that 
rights may conflict with and limit one another30. It is not surprising giving that rights are 
instruments to protect certain interests, and interests may of course conflict with each other, 
because resources are overall limited, because their realization may entail incompatible 
behaviours on the same people, because someone’s interest may require the behaviour of 
someone else which is protected by a right (immunity, freedom, lack of claim), and so on31. 
Moreover, rights may also be limited by interests and values that are not protected by other 
rights, but which are considered as particularly important for the general interest32. 
Conflicts between rights, or between rights and general interests or values, and the 
consequent arising limits, are not a nice thing. They are not what a defender of rights, and 
human rights in particular, wishes to face; there is always the fear they might endanger the 
power of rights, entering a dangerous slippery slope leading to a flat landscape where rights 
have no higher position than other interests, values and principles. Many are in fact the 
theories – mostly grouped under the name coherence theories and opposed to those called 
pluralist theories – which prefer to take a different route, one leading to a land of harmony 
 
 
30  According to Waldron, «when we say rights in conflict what we really mean is that the duties they imply are not 
compossible» (WALDRON 1993, 206). The duty holder may find herself in a condition of impossibility to fulfil two 
or more rights of two or more right-holders, or two or more rights of the same right-holder. 
31  COMANDUCCI (2004, 322) identifies two conditions for the rise of conflicts (abstract incompatibility) between 
two norms recognizing (fundamental) rights: both have the same (or partially the same) scope; the first ascribes to 
certain subjects a favourable normative positions (among those elected by Hohfeld, such as a claim), and the 
second ascribes to other subjects the opposite of the correlative of that first position (a privilege rather than a duty). 
32  Among the many examples, article 29 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights conditions, in exceptional 
circumstances, rights and freedoms to limitations necessary to secure the requirements of morality, public order and 
general welfare in a democratic society. Some of these interests and values might be, ultimately, traceable back to 
other rights (as necessary conditions to guarantee their fulfilment), but that’s not how they are presented nor treated. 
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where real rights or their real content do not conflict with each other, nor with the really 
important external interests and values33. 
Coherence theories cannot erase the scarcity of resources, nor impel actual conflicts between 
single interests, values and needs. What they, instead, appear to be doing is shifting external 
limits arising from external considerations to internal ones, in a domain intrinsic to the right 
and fit to dismiss the emergence of conflicts as real ones. Are these internal limits equivalent to 
the internal limits stemming from the double foundations of rights? A brief look at coherence 
theories might help understand34. 
According to the heterogeneous set of theories that may be labelled illusory conflict 
declination35, conflicts only appear prima facie36. More specifically, according to monist theories the 
rights system (either legal, moral, or political) can be read under one supreme end or principle 
that should guide the interpretation and application of each right, ensuring that no real conflicts 
may arise. In case of conflict, the common end or principle will guide us towards a harmonic 
interpretation of the rights in question, showing us that the conflict has, in fact, never been 
there. Each of the apparently conflicting rights had already inherent limits which we might 
have overlooked at first, but under the light of the common end or principle we will be shown 
the path along which no conflicts, and hence no fearful external limits, are encountered37. 
Alternatively, it is claimed to be sufficient to reveal the true hierarchy existing between rights 
or between rights and other very important interests, values or principles38. It is so possible to 
understand where a right is to be placed and whether, henceforth, it should prevail or not – 
without being externally limited, but actually allowing its correct application within its internal 
limits. This argumentative strategy builds on the belief that values and rights belong to a 
coherent system (for example the Constitutional one) whose hierarchy, though maybe not 
immediately evident, is already set and certain. The interpreter facing an illusory conflict hence 
would have to look for such hierarchy and apply it to the concrete case39. 
 
 
33  As MALDONADO MUÑOZ (2016, 126) suggests, the debate on the existence, or lack thereof, of conflicts between 
fundamental rights is not characterized by a coherent, tidy, mono-dimensional set of theories. They are 
heterogeneous, at times overlapping or incoherent among them. What I present here is a brief and simple 
reconstruction which heavily builds on CELANO (2013) and PINO (2010). 
34  The most easily dismissed of these theories, or better say group of theories, minimalist theories (CELANO 2013, 131–133), 
resolves the issue calling for the “hard currency” (STEINER 1998, 233–239) of rights against their unjustified, dangerous 
and costly inflations. According these theories (referred to as minimum core declination theories in PINO 2010, 145), there is 
only a small core of rights, which is precise, determined, non-conflicting, hence there are no conflicts between real rights, 
though there might be apparent ones between real rights and fake ones. Following, for example, Nozick’s description of 
rights as moral side constraints, the pool of rights is so confined that conflicts and consequent violations are hard to 
picture (though not impossible as he himself admits: «The question of whether these side constraints are absolute, or 
whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure 
might look like, is one I hope largely to avoid» (NOZICK 1974, 30 in note)). This declination is not particularly interesting 
because it cannot explain the current ever-growing and messy reality of human rights. It forces its supporters to reduce 
the number of real rights to a very limited core, usually excluding social rights, group rights, and new generation rights. 
35  CELANO 2013, 138 ff.  
36  CELANO 2013, 139. 
37  So, taking an example used by DWORKIN (2006), the apparent conflict between the right to free speech and the 
dignity of every person is resolved in the case of hate speech by showing that, in fact, the real right to free speech does 
not include the right to abuse minorities and call for their segregation: in the right to free speech there is an intrinsic 
(internal) limit to protect the dignity of minorities, which stems from the common end of the legal system of 
respecting and protecting human dignity and equality (the ultimate fundamental value of the system). The limit to 
the right to free speech, found in the dignity of minorities, is intrinsic to the right itself. It is, an internal limit. 
38  The true hierarchy may be obtained through the interpretation of the supreme goal or principle, or through the 
interpretation of the Constitution, which may contain a number of different principles and goals that should guide 
each interpreter towards the correct application of the law as it should be. For a position focused on the paramount 
role of the Constitution – within democratic Constitutional States – see FERROJOLI (2001; 2004). 
39  Things are not as easy as one may think after reading my brief reconstruction. The identification of the correct 
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Finally, according to other authors40, to solve illusory conflicts between rights it claimed to be 
sufficient to proceed with their specification: i.e. if all the intrinsic limits of a right are discovered 
conflicts may disappear41. These limits were already there, within the right42. They were part of 
its true meaning and scope and are not contingent on the situation of conflict that has emerged43.  
The debate between coherence theories and pluralist ones is vast and it is not necessary to 
enter its awry roads. It is sufficient to say that according to pluralist theories, instead, conflicts 
between rights may occur, and it is not possible to identify a criterion able to guide the 
resolution of conflicts before they actually occur44. But a position is to be taken to understand 
whether or not what we have identified as the internal limits stemming from two foundations 
correspond to the internal limits of coherence theories. 
Coherence theories build on the idea of a coherent normative web, where all interests, values, 
and principles of the system are predetermined – though maybe not self-evident, as yet. There 
is a predetermined hierarchy of rights, or a real content of each right that intrinsically takes in 
consideration all other rights, principles and values to draw the borders of rights themselves, or 
there is a common end to be reached through the application of rights. The framework in which 
rights, and human rights in particular, find themselves in (may it be the international human 
rights law one, or the regional human rights law one, or one of the many national ones) 
presupposes, instead, an atomistic vision of values, one in which each value (or set of values) 
 
 
hierarchy is a very complex task, even according to those authors that think of it as a possible enterprise. For 
example, according to MORESO (2006 – see also 2002), it is not possible to coherently and comprehensively 
reconstruct all moral principles of a system in order to identify the correct hierarchy to apply to a concrete case.  
40  «When rights appear to conflict with other oral considerations, including other rights, we may resolve the 
tension by reducing either the scope of the right or its stringency» (SHAFER-LANDAU 1995, 225). See also OBERDIEK 
(2008), who distinguishes between general rights – which are «general in virtue of the fact that their content does 
not depend at all upon context» - and specified rights – which are «specified in virtue of the fact that their content 
nevertheless depends entirely on context» (128). See also STEINER 1977; 1994; THOMSON 1977, 49; MARMOR 1997; 
MORESO 2006 (for some of the critics raised against Moreso, see CELANO 2002 and COMANDUCCI 2004; for a reply 
see MORESO 2002a). 
41  The specification manoeuvre is not an easy task. Gewirth describes three criteria to correctly identify all the 
permissible specifications of a right so that it may be «entirely valid without any further exception», i.e. absolute 
(GEWIRTH 1981, 95 f.): specifications shall be recognizable in ordinary practical thinking, «justifiable through a 
valid moral principle», «able to avoid disastrous consequences of fulfilling the right». 
42  What may appear as external limitations – conflicts – stemming from the interaction with other rights, principles 
or values, are, in fact, limits that each right already entails, inherently. So the right that «your-box-not-be-broken-
into-and-your-drug-not-taken-without-your-consent» was, actually, «your-box-not-be-broken-into-and-your-drug-
not-taken-without-your-consent-when-there-is-no-child-who-needs-that-drug-for-life» (THOMSON 1977, 49). 
43  So for example, according to OBERDIEK (2008, 134 f.), in the famous cabin case pictured by FEINBERG (1978) – a 
hiker breaks into a cabin in the mountains to save himself from a storm – the property right of the cabin owner is 
not justifiably contravened: it simply does not entail the possibility of forbidding someone in special need to enter 
the cabin (and hence does not entitle the owner to a compensation for the beak-in). On the point see also SHAFER-
LANDAU (1995), who explains that according to pluralist theories the right that the hiker breaks is a general right, a 
prima facie right which does not include any specification. He claims, instead, that a much better reconstruction of 
rights accounts for a set of full-fledged rights, much more specific and hence, importantly, fully inviolable.  
44  Pluralist theories do not simply accept the existence of conflicts among rights and particular important interests: 
they also provide paths for solutions. GUASTINI (2006) describes the technique usually applied by Constitutional 
judges as one creating a mobile assiological hierarchy, i.e. a one-time-only hierarchy based on a value-judgment 
through which the judge establishes which principle is to prevail in the single concrete case. On the same lines, 
according to the principle of proportionality proposed by ALEXY (2002; 2005), conflicts among principles (unlike 
conflicts among rules which are to be solved through hierarchical, chronological, or speciality criteria) are to be 
balanced one with the other: one has to bend in favour of the other to the least possible extend, just as much as it is 
needed to realize the first. However, this process has a one-time-only value because each circumstance is different and 
requires its particular balancing. Hence, it is not possible to find fixed paths of solutions, such as for example stating 
that one principle is hierarchically superior to another and should always prevail, or stating that a certain principle 
already includes, intrinsically, certain limitations in favour of other principles. 
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acts on its own to survive and then, once it reaches the surface, starts fighting with all other 
values not to be drowned. In such a chaotic and unstable framework each right arises to protect 
a certain interest that is not already part of a coherent, pre-ordered system. The current (and 
potentially changing) structure is the product of the accumulation of fights to uphold 
individuals’ and groups’ interests. Fights scattered through time and space, each pursuing its 
own ends on the ground of argumentations concentrated on the specific interests, principles, 
values at stake. In such a framework, there is no guaranteed coherence among the 
heterogeneous values or goals that belong to it, nor among the means available to reach them. 
Coherence theories, hence, do not appear adequate to account for it. 
If coherence theories and their internal limits are dismissed as inadequate to describe the real 
unstable, untidy, scattered framework where rights are placed, we have to admit that the 
internal limits stemming from the conflicts between two foundations, as those of biocultural 
rights, cannot be described as equivalent to the internal limits of coherent theories. The two 
“types” of limits cannot be turned one into another without losing part of the information they 
carry with themselves: without turning them into something different from what they were 
meant to be. 
The question we are now left with is: are what we labelled as internal limits of double-
foundation rights actually different from/not equivalent to classical external limits of rights? In 
other words, may the so-called internal limits of biocultural rights be turned into external 
limits, without losing relevant features or adding inappropriate ones? 
 
 
4. External limits: that’s all folks? 
 
In order to answer to this question, a look at two examples – the right to freedom of expression 
and parental rights – might be very helpful. In particular, we will engage in a thought 
experiment entailing the shifting of external limits to internal ones to try to understand 
whether the two can be considered to be equivalent. 
 
4.1. The importance of being internal: right to freedom of expression 
 
Freedom of expression is commonly understood to be a human right. It safeguards the intrinsic 
value of every person by protecting her fundamental interest in expressing ideas and 
communicating with other people45. However, we are also used to see it limited46, and perceive 
it as correct (though maybe not at specific times). 
Would its limits change (or their consequences would) if we moved a value which is 
benefitted by the right to freedom of expression inside its foundations47. We could concentrate 
on the fact that freedom of expression can also benefit the interest in the general growth of 
knowledge and culture. What happens, then, if we draw the right to freedom of expression as 
also, grounded on this interest? If, in other words, the growth of knowledge became an interest 
to be promoted through the realization of the freedom of expression?  
 
 
45  I will here regard the interest of every person to express her ideas and communicate with other people as the 
foundation of the right to freedom of expression. It is, of course, not the only way to picture the right, as other 
values and interests may be regarded as its foundation. However, I will not dwell on these different options 
because it seems to me to be irrelevant for the proposed thought experiment. 
46  The right to privacy of other people, the safeguard of public order and security, the dignity of other people and 
so on are typical examples of external limits to such important freedom. For an analysis of some justifications 
concerning restrictions to the right to freedom of expression see SCANLON (1972). 
47 Similarly, in the biocultural rights case the conservation of the environment is benefitted (most of the time) by 
the protection of the interests of indigenous interests.  
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First of all, it would feel hard to accept that only those people who are likely to exercise the 
right to freedom of expression in ways that contribute to the growth of knowledge are entitled 
to it. Similarly, we would feel uncomfortable if the recognition of this right was conditioned to 
the results of empirical tests controlling its ability to generate an increase in knowledge and 
culture. We would hardly welcome these practices as in line with the very grounding of 
freedom of expression – at least not with the way we are used to perceive it. We would rather 
consider them as serious violations.  
If conditioning the freedom of expression in this way seems unacceptable, it is because we 
are used to regard the interest of every person to communicate as the proper and only foundation 
of this right, not, also, the interest in the growth of knowledge. The latter can easily be 
considered an interest to be protected, but as long as it acts as a limit from the outside of the 
structure of the right to freedom of expression. Limits justified by the defence of the growth of 
knowledge are usually perceived as having a very high (and often controversial) threshold – 
such as for example the denial of the holocaust, or politically-relevant fake news. In fact, we do 
not, usually, regard it as one of the raison d’être of such right: the latter may exist and be 
exercised even if it does not lead to the growth of knowledge. 
Hence, it seems possible to say that if we shifted an external value often promoted by a right 
inside its structure, turning it into one of its foundations, we would expand its influence on the 
right: we would be giving, in this case to the growth of knowledge, a force it did not have before. A 
force resembling very much that of a duty, a duty imposed on the right-holder: when you exercise the 
right to freedom of expression you should, also, promote the growth of knowledge/should not act in ways that 
are detrimental to the growth of knowledge. The two structures, we may say, are not equivalent.  
A different example, parental rights, might rise the suspicion that the issue is more complex 
than it seems at the moment. 
 
4.2. The un-importance of being internal: parental rights  
 
Parental rights could be described as having two heterogeneous foundations/grounding 
interests. On one side we could picture the interest of the parent to exercise her role as parent, 
including living with her child, taking decisions concerning her present and future activities, 
etc. The parent’s interest grounds a cluster of normative positions in her favour, which 
correspond to duties on, mostly, the State and the rest of the community. However, we may 
also say that parental rights are grounded on a second foundation: the interest of the child to be 
taken care of and given the means necessary for her full development as a human being. This 
interest, we could argue, grounds another cluster of favourable normative positions on behalf of 
the child and the corresponding cluster of unfavourable normative positions on the State, the 
community, and the parent. The interest of the child in having a good life and developing as a 
human being is precisely the limiting point as well as the ultimate goal of the favourable 
positions of the parent: not only the parent may exercise them only so far as they do not 
damage the child, but she should actually exercise them in ways that promote child’s interests.  
This set of limits to the favourable positions of the parent stems from the very foundations 
of parental rights, which, according to this description, include the interest of the child in being 
treated so to promote her wellbeing and development. So framed, hence, the limit seems to be 
an internal one stemming from one of the foundations of the right itself, and not from another 
right or particularly important general interest. 
Now, focussing on our shifting exercise, we could also describe parental rights has having 
one foundation and having to be balanced with the (external) right of the child to her full 
development and wellbeing. We could say that parental rights are to be recognized to protect 
the fundamental interests of parents to act as parents, and that this interest grounds a set of 
favourable positions of the parents and the corresponding unfavourable positions on the State 
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and the community as a whole. This, simpler (single-foundation) right would then be balanced 
with other rights, including the child’s right to her full development and wellbeing, which 
grounds another set of rights and corresponding duties – some of which on the parents 
themselves. These rights and duties are to be balanced with parental rights: they act as limits, 
external ones, to parental rights. Such a shift from a structure to the other (double foundation 
right, to externally limited single foundation right) can be undertaken without losing sight of 
any of the elements, i.e. interests, values, principles, that the rights aim at protecting, nor 
dismissing any of the normative positions that arise on the right and duty holders. The two 
structures, we could say, seem equivalent. Parental rights could ground solely on parents’ 
interests and then find an external limit, including a set of duties, in the child’s right. 
How, then, can it be that when we looked for clues in the right to freedom of expression, we 
found that there was a difference in terms of the normative positions that arose in the single 
and double foundation declinations? How come we saw the emergence of limits which we did 
not have in our hands before when we shifted to a double foundation right to freedom of 
expression? A step backward is necessary to understand. 
 
 
5. He’s just not that into you 
 
If we look attentively at the two thought experiments, we see that there is an important 
distinguishing point between what lied behind parental rights, and what lied behind the right to 
freedom of expression. And it seems to be the reason that led to such opposite results.  
Let’s walk back to the right to freedom of expression. In our thought experiment we saw how 
the growth of knowledge, once moved from interest benefitted by the freedom of expression to 
second foundation of the right, grew in power and prominence and led to the raise of different 
normative positions. Well, no surprise, we turned the turkey for the Christmas dinner into one 
of the farmer’s sons48! 
More specifically, by shifting the growth of knowledge from outside to inside the right we 
did not, simply, turn it into one of the right’s foundations. We first needed to make it able to 
become a foundation. In other words, we did a triple (not single) operation:  
 
- First, we boosted its rank to that of value strong enough to be able to commonly limit (be 
balanced with) the freedom of expression. 
- Secondly, we bound the realization and protection of the freedom of expression to the 
realization and protection of the growth of knowledge. We made the strength of the bond 
between the two interests much higher than it was. 
- Then, we shifted the growth of knowledge from the position of one of the values which is, at 
times, fostered by the realization of the right to freedom of expression, to one of the 
reasons/points of that right to exist (i.e. a foundation). 
 
In other words, our thought experiment did not entail a simple shifting exercise, from outside to 
inside. It entailed three different steps. Had the first two steps not been necessary, then the 
 
 
48  MACCORMICK’s (1976, 80) example with children and turkeys explains the difference existing between a 
value/interest grounding a right and a value/interest which is benefitted by the realization of a right. MacCormick 
claims that there is a duty on a farmer to feed both his sons and turkeys: turkeys are to be fed to get fat and be eaten 
for Christmas, while kids are to be fed because it is a very important interest they have. The feeding occurs for the 
turkeys because their wellbeing is a means to an end – the Christmas lunch – while it occurs for the children because 
their wellbeing is an end in itself which grounds a set of rights (unless maybe we are talking about Hansel and Gretel 
being fed by the witch). 
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experiment would have produced different results. If, for example,  
 
- we already regarded the growth of knowledge as a value so important to be able to commonly 
limit the freedom of expression; and  
- we already thought, along the lines of Mill49, that the freedom of expression’s raison d’être, its 
point, the reason for which it should be entitled protection through the form of rights, is the 
fact that its realisation leads, also, to the growth of knowledge, 
 
then our shifting exercise would have led to the raise of the same normative positions. On the 
contrary, normally, we perceive the growth of knowledge as important, but not enough to 
commonly limit the freedom of expression; and, normally, we perceive its bond with freely 
expressing ideas and communicating with other people as important, but not as paramount. 
 Hence, the reason why the two thought experiments suggested two opposite answers – 
internal or external limits are equivalent/are not equivalent in terms of arising normative 
positions – is due to the fact that the two experiments, actually, required different operations50. 
 In fact, if we look at the parental rights case, we see how: 
 
- the wellbeing of the child is, already, normally considered as sufficiently important to ground 
rights and prevail, most of the times, on the interests of parents; 
- it is, already, common to perceive the bond existing between the interest of a parent and the 
interest of a child as paramount. 
 
Hence, structuring parental rights as having two distinct foundations, did not bring to changes in 
the arising normative positions (as compared with single-foundation parental rights balanced with 
the rights of the child) because parental rights were already bond to and limited by children’s rights. 
Similarly, in the case of biocultural rights, the link between indigenous peoples’ interests and 
the conservation of the environment is not made up on the spot. It is the product of a long 
history of conservation practices and of political fights based, precisely, on the contribution 
indigenous peoples and local communities can bring to the environment. Hence, we could say, 
they could be equivalent to indigenous peoples rights limited by an internationally recognized 
(as it is not, yet) right of nature to exist and flourish. 
In this case, as in the parental rights one, the idea of care, stewardship, responsibilities are 
central to the rhetorical and political discussion. They are the glue that binds together the two 
foundations and that can generate this strange thing internal limits seem to be51. 
What we learnt from the two thought experiments is that: shifting an external value/interest (y) 
benefitted by a right (A') into one of its foundations – turning it into right (A) with a double 
foundation (x and y) – does not bring any change in the arising normative positions, if, and only if:  
 
- the value/interest (y) is already perceived as so important as able to commonly limit (be 
balanced with) the single foundation right (A'); 
- the value/interest (y) is strongly bound to the other value/interest (x). 
 
 
49  MILL 1859, chapter II, in particular 95 ff. Mill would, however, unlikely agree on conditioning the freedom of 
expression to the growth of knowledge – as, according to him, the growth of knowledge may flourish only through 
the lack of limits to the freedom of expression. 
50  The whole shifting exercise presupposed a certain understanding of the values involved, a certain ideological 
mindset. The mindset that may be considered to be the most common one, i.e. children’s interests considered so 
important to prevail over (most) parents’ choices; the growth of knowledge considered to be, most of the time, less 
important than the preservation of the freedom of each person to express her/him self. 
51  It would, overall, appear quite inappropriate to structure a right as having two foundations which are perceived 
as having a weak or inexistent bond, or, even worst, which are more often in conflict with each other than not. 
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It is important to notice that even though we stressed the importance of the existence of a very 
strong bond and on the ideas of care, stewardship, responsibilities, we witnessed the rise of limits. 
The emergence of limits seems to derive from the fact that the two foundations might most 
often walk hand in hand, but, unless we fall for the environmentally noble savage or noble parent 
trap, they, also, might not. Parents’ desires, interests, and even needs might fall under the realm 
of the idea of care, responsibility, stewardship, but they might as well not. Similarly, not all 
indigenous peoples are sustainable, nor will necessarily be so in the future. And here it is where 
conflicts, and consequent limits, emerge. If the two foundations were always harmoniously 
interlinked, we would not encounter internal limits but, rather, that land of harmony that 
biocultural rights promised at first52.  
 
 
6. Internal limits strike back 
 
6.1. The interpreter 
 
According to our analysis, there seem to be no different normative positions that arise if a right 
is described as internally, rather than externally, limited (or vice versa). However, we have so 
far treated the world as if it was a normatively (morally, legally, politically) transparent one. A 
world where every interpreter of rights (it being a judge, a civil servant, a policy maker, a State 
representative, an activist, a lawyer, a representative of an indigenous people, a protected area 
administrator) understands them in the same way, according to a strict line of normative 
reasoning that leads, always, to the same correct results. A world where all interpreters have a 
sterilized understanding of the values they deal with, and of the normative positions they 
contain – as if the latter were predetermined and static. 
However, the world of rights is as far as it may be from being normatively transparent. It is 
a world of passion, of interests, of politics, where the way a right, its constitutive elements and 
their respective weights, and the weight of the right as compared to the weight of other rights 
and interests, depend on the history of that right: by whom it was advocated for, under which 
pressures, to challenge which injustices, to protect the value of what, or which interest of 
whom, with which idea of justice in mind, with which rhetorical arguments. In the real world 
of politics, injustices, aspirations and hopes, the architecture of a right is important for the way 
in which their interpreters expect it to be applied, wish it to be developed, fear to see it 
implemented. It is a world where the difference between internal and external limits may still 
be, as we shall soon see, surprisingly, relevant.  
A fresh new look at the strange features we pointed out for biocultural rights might help us 
analyse which of them were related (and how) to the double/single foundation framework and 
which were not. 
 
1) More pervasive limits 
The favourable normative positions recognized to indigenous peoples through biocultural 
rights appear as not only limited by other rights or very important interests of the collectivity. 
They appear to be limited, also, by the interest for the protection of the environment, whether a 
particularly important matter arises or not. 
 
 
52  I am much indebted to Giorgio Maniaci for the development of this paragraph. Talking to him has enlighten 
some of the more complex aspects of the idea of care and of the complexities of distinguishing between the right to 
act as caregiver and the duty to act as such. For a reconstruction of the concept of liberal/egalitarian autonomy 
encompassing, both, the right to be taken care of and the right not to be taken care of (to be left alone), see 
MANIACI 2012, 89 ff. 
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If right A has a double foundation, entailing the protection of x and y, both interests shall always 
be balanced one with the other when the right is implemented. So, for example, the interest of the 
child in developing to her fullest is not something that limits the right of a parent (framed with a 
double foundation) only if the parent has an unconventional desire (such as prohibiting a blood 
transfer in case of need). The interest of the child limits (is to be balanced with) the interests of the 
parent even in normal circumstances, such as when choosing which school to attend. 
If x and y both make up the foundations of right A they are always nearby: any interpreter 
sees them constantly together. Therefore, the interpreter is likely to require their balancing, not 
only in special circumstances – when she is required to stop and think – but also when she acts 
rapidly and spontaneously, because no extra effort is needed to make both salient: no need to 
look at other rights and particularly important interests and wonder whether they are relevant 
to the case and should be balanced with interest x.  
If instead right A is founded only on the protection of interest x, and interest y is protected 
by other rights or very important interests of the collectivity (it acts as an external limit), y is 
likely to be perceived as something not always pertinent with the implementation of right A. Y 
does not, in all circumstances, act as a limit, it is contingent and conditional on something 
which needs to occur to light a bulb in the interpreter’s mind. Y figures as something weaker 
than an interest positioned at the very root of right A, because it is less salient. Packs of 
associations with other cases, other subjects or other interests, as well as perceptions of bonds 
and priorities, or the emergence of histories and memories may arise in the interpreters’ mind 
only if she sees the reference to y at the very foundation of right A.  
 
2) Rise of unexpected duties 
Biocultural rights were accompanied by the rise of unexpected duties towards the protection 
of the environment on indigenous peoples. 
If right A has a double foundation, entailing the protection of x and y, both shall always be 
promoted through the implementation of right A. So, for example, the interests of the child shall 
always be promoted when double-foundation parental rights are exercised. They should be the 
guiding beacons of parents’ choices, not simply their limiting point.  
Following what understood above (§ 5), the rise of unexpected limits, entailing duties as 
well, was due to the fact that a value or interest was elevated to a rank it did not have 
before/was not fully visible or accepted before. The rise unexpected limits was not due to the 
double foundation per se, but to the fact that in the new discourse the weight of an 
interest/value was considered to be higher53. 
 
3) Changes in requirements 
In order to be holder of biocultural rights, it is not sufficient to qualify as indigenous people. 
It is necessary to be, also, sustainable and willing to act sustainably. 
If right A has a double foundation, entailing the protection of x and y, in order to qualify as 
holder of right A, a subject needs to have certain characteristics related to both x and y. So, for 
example, to be recognised as holder of parental rights, one needs to be a parent (or to be entitled 
to act as such) and to be able/willing to care for her child. In fact, a parent that ceases to be able 
to/willing to properly care for her child, may lose her (double foundation) parental rights 
because the grounding interests she was recognized them for have halted to exist. 
 
 
53  As in the freedom of expression discourse, in indigenous peoples rights talks the protection of the environment, 
is not, usually, regarded as a value whose weight is strong enough to limit indigenous peoples rights (beyond very 
exceptional circumstances), nor to bring to life environmental duties on indigenous peoples. In the biocultural 
rights discourse, instead, the environment is treated as an interest strong enough to be balanced with other really 
important interests able to ground human rights. 
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a. The double foundation, in this case, brings to life a significant change to a right. It changes 
the list of potential holders.  
b. It also has another more subtle, but important, consequence. 
 
To be a right-holder means to be considered valuable. It contains an intrinsic positive 
qualification54. On the contrary, not qualifying for a right, getting close but not close enough, 
is likely to suggest a negative qualification. Hence, structuring a right as having two 
foundations means that qualifying as a right holder becomes harder. In fact, not only the 
subject needs to be in possession of certain characteristics related to the initial foundation (x), 
such as being – biologically or legally – a parent, or being indigenous. The subject also needs 
to be in possession of certain characteristics related to the second foundation (y), such as 
being able to take care of a child, or being sustainable. In this way interest/value y becomes 
more influential, as it becomes able to tell which subjects may be entitled to become 
rightholders55. This consideration would of course, be unfounded and inexplicable if rights, 
and the world of rights, were perceived as normatively transparent, tidy and characterized by 
clear and evident correct and sterilized interpretations. Qualifying or not as a right-holder 
would not carry with it positive/negative considerations: it would be a simple ticking box 
exercise (you have/you do not have quality 1/quality 2). 
 
6.2. Before final credits: few words on remedies56 
 
Before moving to the conclusions, a not-so-small further point needs to be discussed.  
Ubi jus ibi remedium: if a right is violated, a remedy is to be provided. This statement is not 
one of those that can be done with a light heart. Beside the not so secondary difficulties 
concerning reaching a court, obtaining a favourable decision, and having it implemented57, there 
lays the whole controversy concerning whether rights which are justifiably infringed – hence 
rightfully limited because of other rights or very important general values – entitle, or not, for 
compensation58. This controversy leads us to a very complex realm of arguments59. However, 
for as complex as these arguments may get, what seems to matter the most is whether an action 
is perceived as (at least partially) normatively flawed or not60, and, hence whether there is some 
kind of normative residue that needs to be compensated for through a remedy. 
For the purpose of our analysis we need to understand whether the presence of internal 
 
 
54  Accordin to POGGE (2008, 61) one of the discontinuities between natural rights and human rights on one side 
and natural law on the other lays, precisely, on the moral value recognized to rightholders: they are sources of 
moral concern, hence, they may ground moral demands, also in the form of rights. 
55  For indigenous peoples, being dismissed as holders of certain rights on the ground of their lack of sustainability 
means saying: indigeneity is not enough, a sentence that was at the root of their land evictions and marginalization 
during (and after) colonization. Hence, the rhetoric of biocultural rights brings back old enemies, which might 
influence the interpretation of indigenous peoples rights, and drive it towards considering environmental 
stewardship a requirement to hold, also, indigenous peoples rights. 
56  I am indebted to Cristina Redondo for raising this controversial point during the XXIV Congreso ítalo-franco-
luso-español de teoría del derecho. I hope to remember correctly her critiques and to be giving them a sufficient reply. 
57  For a reconstruction of international human rights law on remedies, see SHELTON 1999. 
58  This controversy brings us back to that concerning coherence theories (specification theories in particular) and 
pluralist ones. On the controversy, see SHAFER-LANDAU 1995. On infringements that derive from wrongful acts 
see, among the others, ROSS 1930, 21 and QUINN 1985. 
59  For different arguments see, among the others, THOMSON 1977, 60; MONTAGUE 1984; MONTAGUE 1988; and 
FEINBERG 1978. 
60  See for example the critique that Montague raises against Thomson and Feinberg on whether the hiker’s break-
into the cabin owner is morally flawed or not (MONTAGUE 1988). 
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rather than external limits makes any difference in terms of remedy. Is a judge likely to rule 
differently if she faces a claim against the allegedly wrongful implementation of an internally 
limited, double-foundation (x and y), right (A); or whether she faces a claim against the 
allegedly wrongful balancing of a single-foundation (x) right (A'), with interest (y)? 
At a first glance, one may think that if x gets limited by y, while right A' may entitle to a 
remedy, right A does not because this is precisely what its double foundation requires61. 
However, after a closer look, the difference does not seem to be so stark. 
First of all, in order to make a valuable assessment we shall compare a right A, with right A' 
understood in a normative system which recognizes the interest acting as second foundation (y) 
as grounding another right or as a very important general interest62. 
Secondly, whether or not the judge will rule in favour of the recognition of remedies will 
depend on the details of the case. However, we can say that she will have to:  
 
- vis à vis right A, verify that both interests x and y have been rightfully taken in consideration 
and weighted one with the other, so as to guarantee that neither interest was excessively 
disregarded/favoured;  
- vis à vis right A', verify that it was rightfully balanced with all other rights and very important 
general interests of the relevant normative system, including the ones grounded on y. 
 
In both cases, the judge will rule on whether all relevant interests were correctly protected or 
not and, if the latter, on whether there is any normative residue that entitles to a remedy. In 
both cases, the judge will deal with the same interests, values and correlative weights. Hence, 
there is no reason to believe that she will, necessarily, act differently. At most, she might be less 
likely to see, perceive, and recognize some sort of unjustified infringement being imposed on the 
double foundation right than in a single foundation one. In fact, she will face a right which 
already entails some intrinsic limitations, thus the threshold considered acceptable might be 
perceived as higher – even though there is no reference whatsoever within right A on where the 
correct threshold should lay – because the salience of each interest/value is likely to be higher – 
both x and y are always present, asking to be taken in consideration and protected63. 
7. Final credits: return of internal limits 
 
Throughout the article we have tried to answer to the question: are internal limits arising from 
conflicting interests acting as foundation of a right anything different from the internal limits 
described by coherence theories or from classic external limits to rights?  
Firstly, coherence theories appeared as actually inadequate to describe the chaotic reality of 
rights, their historical character and their messy normative grounds. Hence, the internal limits 
 
 
61  Just like, one may think, it is the case when dealing with biocultural rights one side and indigenous peoples 
rights on the other: while the first should of course bend to environmental considerations, the second does not and, 
if forced to, entitles to a remedy. 
62  This comparison may appear rather counterintuitive, but if we compared, for example, biocultural rights with 
indigenous rights in the current international legal system, which does not recognize such a prominent weight to the 
conservation of the environment, we would be comparing two assets which are, clearly, very different: their weights 
and elements are different, hence the presence of internal or external limits is bound to lead to different results.  
63  For example, we could compare biocultural rights with indigenous peoples rights understood in a legal system which 
recognizes the rights of nature. A State decides to turn the ancestral land of an indigenous community into a National 
Park. The community can continue to live on most of its ancestral land, but its use of natural resources is limited. Even 
though in the international law system we are picturing indigenous peoples rights shall be balanced with the right of 
nature, the community may abide to a court to obtain a remedy, claiming that restrictions are disproportionate. Hence, 
the people might be entitled to a remedy. Vis à vis biocultural rights, the community may still abide to a court claiming 
that the limitations imposed are neither necessary nor adequate, and the people might be entitled to a remedy. However, 
it might be less likely to be granted because the judge may be more inclined to consider the limitations as proportionate. 
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that coherence theories use were dismissed as unable to account for the internal limits deriving 
from the double foundation of rights.  
We then wondered whether internal limits and external limits actually produce equivalent 
results. In order to answer to this question, we looked at two examples. The right to freedom of 
expression suggested that turning external limits into internal ones brings changes in the 
normative positions that arise. On the contrary, parental rights showed how parental rights 
with a double foundation (and, hence, internally limited) produce equivalent results to a single-
foundation parental right balanced with a single foundation child right. 
The two examples led to opposite results. Here we noted how the freedom of expression was 
not truly appropriate to be compared with parental rights. It required us an extra operation to 
move the growth of knowledge from outside to inside the right: granting the growth of 
knowledge a weigh it did not have before. A weight that made it able to commonly limit the 
freedom of expression. We added to the legal/ethical/political framework a new interest able to 
limit the freedom of expression64. On the contrary, in the parental rights example, the interests 
of the child did not need any boost in rank. They were already perceived as so important as to 
be able to limit parental rights. The latter example, hence, was the only really appropriate for 
our comparison between internal and external limits. And it seemed to suggest that the 
difference between them is pure architecture of rights, something that leads to the same results.  
Before moving on, we underlined that not all interests can be clustered together as 
foundations of a right: they need to walk hand in hand most of the time, as in the case of 
parental rights and biocultural rights; they need to be bound by ideas of care, responsibility, 
stewardship. Binding together in the foundations of a right two mostly/always conflicting 
interests would result in an over-limited right whose realization would be quite unrealistic and 
counter-intuitive: both interests would appear to be continuously limiting one-an-other.  
How come, we wondered, this close relationships led to conflicts and consequent limits? 
Here, we found an answer in the denial of the noble savage nor a noble parent myth: care is not 
pure correspondence of wills and interests of the carer and the cared-for. For this reason, 
double-foundation rights may incur in the internal limits we are exploring.  
When all seemed to suggest the equivalence of internal and external limits, we stopped to 
look again at the three features of biocultural rights which were pointed out at the very 
beginning of the article. And we noted that:  
 
- the (2) raise of unexpected duties was the consequence of a change in the recognition of the 
weight of a value/interest – a boost in rank which changed its ability to limit rights – hence 
it was not due the fact that an interest was shifted from external to internal; 
- the (1) increase in pervasiveness of limits and the (3) consequences of the creation of extra 
requirements to become rightholders, could instead be ascribed to the fact that the architecture of 
a right entails a double foundation – because the world of rights is chaotic, and interpreters of 
rights do not have a sterilized understanding of them. 
 
The difference between internal and external limits that we have thus encountered seems to lay 
somewhere deep inside the way rights are perceived, understood, felt, and it influences the way 
in which rights are used, or are expected (wished, feared) to be used. It seems to derive from the 
 
 
64  Apparently, the double foundation changed the results of the game between freedom of expression and growth 
of knowledge. But the truth is that the results of the game were changed by turning the growth of knowledge into 
an interest able to commonly limit the freedom of expression. In fact, such change in the results of the game would 
have been the same if the boost in the rank of the growth of knowledge was undertaken, while the creation of the 
double foundation right to freedom of expression was not. A single foundation right to freedom of expression 
would equally be limited by the boosted growth of knowledge. 
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fact that interpreters (whoever they may be) are people, not machines (yet!). They hold a body 
of knowledge, memories, values and feelings which may or may not be evocated by a right, 
depending on its architecture, depending on how the right is dressed up. If it contains already 
inside its structure two interests they are always, both, salient, and will most likely be taken in 
consideration. If, instead, it contains only one interest it will be balanced only with those other 
interests that openly enter in conflict with it – only with those that make themselves salient in 
other ways and for other, contingent, reasons. Similarly, qualifying or not as holder of a right 
(because of its single or double foundation) is accompanied by potentially substantial difference 
in the way a subject is perceived: you are not good enough, a double-foundation right may say. 
And even if there are other sets of rights protecting that same subject, the rejection is likely to 
have political repercussions in its perception of the self and in the way others perceive 
her/him/it. Likewise, having a single or double foundation does not entail stark and necessary 
differences in the recognition of remedies, but it may influence what an interpreter perceives to 
be dealing with. A right with a double foundation and hence doomed to accept limitations, or a 
single-foundation right whose weight and importance are jeopardized by other rights or general 
interests. Even though no different decision is due, the interpreter may be more inclined to rule 
for the recognition of remedies vis à vis the single-foundation right. 
Finally, we can say that an interpreter is unlikely to be indifferent to the fact that a right builds 
on one foundation or on two concurring and mutually limiting ones. The cause of these different 
perceptions may lay in a layer which is not explicitly conscious to an interpreter. A layer which 
influences her explicit reasoning, but which does not, always nor necessarily, appear clearly in her 
mind nor bring to the same results. This consideration may appear rather discomforting, as one 
could expect for rights to be always implemented in the most appropriate way – always balanced 
with all other relevant interests, not only those that (by chance) materialise to the interpreter’s 
mind. However, rights are historical products, just like humans are. And no human performance 
can be fully unbiased by the concrete realities of our minds and their circuits. 
Our enquire into the opaque aspects of the internal limits of biocultural rights led to many 
considerations concerning the architecture of rights, all somehow related to the way rights are 
perceived by their interpreters (whoever they may be). They led to considerations concerning 
what may or may not influence peoples’ understanding of rights. We did not concentrate on 
whether these understandings were or were not correct, but we tried to take in consideration 
their causes and consequences (in terms of decisions and remedies, for example). As the article 
developed, we found ourselves in a realm more and more distant from the classical grounds of 
legal theory. We moved into the realm of questions concerning the way concepts are construed 
in our minds and we found ourselves opening the doors of new disciplines and methodologies. 
It is now probably time to acknowledge the need to more profoundly engage with them, 
especially if we are truly interested in understanding how rights (and legal concepts in general) 
work in the real world of peoples and their minds, rather than in the abstract world of concepts. 
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